Collective Decision-Making:

Collective Decision-Making:

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In the last decade the techniques of social choice theory, game theory and positive political theory have been combined in interesting ways so as to pro vide a common framework for analyzing the behavior of a developed political economy. Social choice theory itself grew out of the innovative attempts by Ken neth Arrow (1951) and Duncan Black (1948, 1958) to extend the range of economic theory in order to deal with collective decision-making over public goods. Later work, by William Baumol (1952), and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), focussed on providing an qeconomicq interpretation of democratic institutions. In the same period Anthony Downs (1957) sought to model representative democracy and elections while William Riker (1962) made use of work in cooperative game theory (by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, 1944) to study coalition behavior. In my view, these qrational choiceq analyses of collective decision-making have their antecedents in the arguments of Adam Smith (1759, 1776), James Madison (1787) and the Marquis de Condorcet (1785) about the qdesignq of political institutions. In the introductory chapter to this volume I briefly describe how some of the current normative and positive aspects of social choice date back to these earlier writers.In terms of outcomes supported by the (1, 4, 5) coalitions, a single outcome from the house design was very close to the predicted competitive solution point. Another outcome was half-way between the predicted outcome and anotheranbsp;...


Title:Collective Decision-Making:
Author: Norman Schofield
Publisher:Springer Science & Business Media - 2013-03-09
ISBN-13:

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